Language is an imperfect and uneven means of communicating information about a complex and nuanced world. We run an experimental investigation of a setting in which the messages available to the sender imperfectly describe the state of the world, however the sender can improve communication, at a cost, by increasing the complexity or elaborateness of the message. As is standard in the communication literature, the sender learns the state of the world then sends a message to the receiver. The receiver observes the message and provides a best guess about the state. The incentives of the players are aligned in the sense that both sender and receiver are paid an amount which is increasing in the accuracy of the receiver's guess. As would be expected, we …nd that larger communication costs are associated with worse outcomes for both sender and receiver. Consistent with the communication literature, albeit in very di¤erent setting, we …nd that there is overcommunication. For the receiver, there is a positive relationship between the payo¤s relative to the equilibrium predictions and communication costs. This relationship is negative for the senders. We also …nd that the response time of both the sender and receiver are positively related to their payo¤s. JEL: C72, C91, D82
Introduction
Words exhibit properties very di¤erent from those of real numbers. For instance, it is not the case that there exists a word with a meaning between any two words. However, words are used to construct statements which convey information about a complex and nuanced reality.
One can use words to express more and more detailed and nuanced information, but only at a cost to the sender. So it is our view that language is an imperfect and uneven means of communicating information about a complex and nuanced world. We run an experimental investigation of a setting in which the language available to the sender imperfectly describes the state of the world, however the sender can improve communication, at a cost, by increasing the complexity or elaborateness of the message. Although we …nd that senders overcommunicate, we also …nd that senders conserve expensive signals and that receivers anticipate this e¤ect. Hertel and Smith (2010) provides a theoretical account of communication where an informed party faces a restricted message space and can send a more elaborate message by incurring a larger cost of communication. Speci…cally, the sender has a set of message elements with which to compose a message. The sender can send a more elaborate message, by composing a message containing more message elements, where the cost is increasing in the number of elements. This would seem to be a natural way to model costly and discrete communication. 1 Hertel and Smith characterize the equilibria, of which there are many.
The authors introduce an out-of-equilibrium condition, whereby under this condition only the most informative class of equilibria remains. The paper makes the prediction that more costly signals will be conserved (sent on smaller regions of the state space) and that communication outcomes for both sender and receiver are decreasing in communication costs incurred by the sender. The present paper can be viewed as an experimental test of the setup and predictions of Hertel and Smith (2010) .
In this experiment, the subjects are anonymously divided into pairs, one as a sender and one as a receiver. As is standard in the communication literature, the sender learns the state 1 See Hertel and Smith (2010) for further discussion of the modeling choices. of the world then sends a message to the receiver. The receiver observes the message and selects an action which a¤ects the payo¤s of both players. The incentives of the players are aligned in the sense that both sender and receiver are paid an amount which is increasing in the accuracy of the receiver's action.
We make two notable departures from the literature. First, the set of messages imperfectly relate to the underlying state space. Second, in order to transmit a more elaborate message, a larger communication cost is incurred by the sender. Here the state space is an integer between 3 and 3. The sender can send a costless message, which we refer to as the empty message. 2 Additionally, the sender can compose a costly message consisting of two possible elements "High" and "Low." Given our state space, these message elements would seem to provide a natural ordering. The cost of a message is then a function of the number of elements in the message. Therefore, the empty message can be transmitted at a cost of 0; the messages "High" and "Low" can be transmitted at a cost of c; and the messages "High High," "High Low," "Low High" and "Low Low" can be transmitted at a cost of 2c, where we vary c.
We …nd that the equilibrium predictions do rather poorly, because the senders are overcommunicating. We …nd that there is a negative relationship between the sender's payo¤s relative to the equilibrium payo¤s and the communication costs. However, we …nd a positive relationship between the receiver's payo¤s relative to the equilibrium payo¤s and the communication costs. We also …nd that the response time is positively related to the payo¤s relative to the equilibrium payo¤s, for both sender and receiver.
Related Literature
There is a literature which tests existing communication models in general and the Crawford and Sobel (1982) model in particular. Perhaps the …rst paper testing Crawford and Sobel was Dickhaut et. al. (1995) whereas more recent examples include Cai and Wang (2006) , and Kawagoe and Takizawa (2009) . Due to the limited ability of subjects to …nd complex equilibria in novel situations, testing communication equilibria typically uses simpli…ed versions of the model. A natural way to accomplish this simpli…cation is to specify the state space as a set of integers rather than the unit interval. For instance, Dickhaut et. al. speci…es the state space as the integers between 1 and 4 and Cai and Wang speci…es the state space as an integer between 1 and 9. We select a state space as the set of integers between 3 and 3 in order to render the signal elements of "High" and "Low" relatively meaningful. Further, we hoped that the empty message would be used to denote the set around the state 0. This would seem to aid in the coordination problem 3 between the sender and receiver. Also note that in Dickhaut et. al. (1995) , Cai and Wang (2006) , and Kawagoe and Takizawa (2009) there is a one-to-one relationship between the state and the set of feasible signals. By contrast, for su¢ciently high communication costs (c), in out paper there is no such pro…table relationship.
Studies of cheap talk communication have found that the senders often overcommunicate. 4
Relatedly there is a literature which …nds that subjects can have an aversion to lying. 5 Again, this literature …nds that senders overcommunicate. Note that our subjects never have an incentive to mislead the sender because the sender and receiver have identical preferences over the action of the receiver. Despite the fact that our experimental environment is quite di¤erent from the setting in these two literatures, we also …nd that the senders overcommunicate. Given that we observe similar behavior in such di¤erent settings, we argue that overcommunication is a robust phenomenon.
Economists have recently become interested in studying the response times of subjects. 6 Research has found that longer response times are associated with more strategic and less automatic reasoning. Consistent with this research, we …nd that longer response times are associated with higher per period payo¤s relative to equilibrium payo¤s, for both sender and receiver.
3 Prior work …nds that subjects can resolve similar coordination problems (Blume et. al., 1998 (Blume et. al., , 2001 Blume and Gneezy, 2000; Kreps, 1990) . However this is not the focus of our paper. 4 For example, see Cai and Wang (2006) and Kawagoe and Takizawa (2009) . 5 For instance, Gneezy (2005) , Hurkens and Kartik (2009) , and Sanchez-Pages and Vorsatz (2007, 2009 ). 6 For instance, Brañas-Garza and Miller (2008), Piovesan and Wengström (2009) , and Rubinstein (2007) 3 Equilibrim Predictions
We now present a discussion of the equilibria as predicted by Hertel and Smith (2010) , which admits only the most informative equilibria. Recall that our state space is s 2 f 3; 2; 1;
The communication costs c(m) are a function of the number of elements transmitted. The receiver has an action space of a 2 f 3; 2:5; 2; 1:5; 1; 0:5; 0; 0:5; 1; 1:5; 2; 2:5; 3g. Both the sender and receiver prefer the receiver to select the action as close to the state as possible. Speci…cally, in each period, the payo¤ to the receiver was the nonnegative integer closest to:
In each period, the payo¤ to the sender was the integer closest to:
For c 2 [0; 12:5], any fully revealing equilibria will exist. Speci…cally, each message is used and a single message is sent for each state. For c 2 [0; 25] then all fully revealing equilibria will exist, with the exception that adjacent states do not have a di¤erence in communication cost of 2c. In each of these fully revealing equilibria, the ex-ante payo¤s are identical: the expected payo¤ for the receiver in each equilibria is EU R = 100 and the expected payo¤ for the sender in each equilibria is EU S = EU R 10 7 c.
For c 2 [25; 94], the equilibria is such that the messages with two elements are not used.
Messages "High" and "Low" are each sent on 2 adjacent states and the empty message is sent on 3 adjacent states. The expected payo¤ of the receiver is EU R = 100 7 + 2 75 7 + 4 94 7 . The expected payo¤ for the sender is EU S = EU R 4 7 c. It should be noted that the equilibrium predictions are identical within each of the intervals mentioned. Therefore, the predictions for equilibrium behavior are the same whether c = 26 or 93.
For c 2 [94; 100] then the equilibria is such that the messages with two elements are not used. Messages "High" and "Low" are each sent on the extreme states, 3 and 3. The empty message is sent on the remaining states. Given the empty message, the receiver is indi¤erent between selecting 0:5 and 0:5. The expected payo¤ to the receiver is EU R = 2 94 7 + 2 44 7 + 2 100 7 . The expected payo¤ to the sender is EU S = EU R 2 7 c. Note that the receiver is indi¤erent between selecting 0:5 and 0:5 but not 0. If the sender is pooling on more than 3 states, the expected payo¤ of selecting 0:5 or 0:5 is 2 94 7 + 2 44 7 = 286 7 and the expected payo¤ of selecting 0 is 100 7 + 2 75 7 = 250 7 . Therefore, selecting an integer action yields a lower payo¤.
For c > 100 then the only equilibria is one in which the sender only sends the empty message for all states and the receiver has no additional information about the state and is therefore indi¤erent among selecting 1:5; 0:5; 0:5 and 1:5. The expected payo¤s are then EU R = EU S = 2 94 7 + 2 44 7 .
Experimental Design
A total of 48 subjects participated in the experiment. The subjects were both undergraduate and graduate students at Rutgers University-Camden. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) . Sessions lasted from 90 to 120 minutes.
In each period, the sender was shown the state, which we referred to as the "secret number."
The state s consisted of an integer between 3 and 3. In order to inform the receiver of its content, the sender was able to transmit a possibly costly message. The message "Empty message" cost c(m) = 0, the messages "High" and "Low" each cost c(m) = c, the messages "High High," "High Low," "Low High," and "Low Low," each cost c(m) = 2c, where c 2 f10; 30; 50; 96g. Upon observing the message, the receiver selected a best guess about the state.
The receiver's action a was selected from the action space of half integers between 3 and 3.
The per period payo¤ to the receiver was the nonnegative integer closest to 100 25(a s) 2 .
The per period payo¤ to the sender was the integer closest to the receiver's payo¤s minus c(m).
In order to aid in the estimation of their payo¤s, the subjects were given a table indicating the payo¤s associated with each state and action selected by the receiver. 7 The subjects were given a $5 show up fee and $1 for every 300 points accumulated. 8
Sender and receiver were matched and played the game for 15 periods where c was held …xed. After the 15 periods, each subject was rematched with a di¤erent opponent, each switched role as sender and receiver, and played with a new value of c. Each trial consisted of 4 rounds of 15 periods. The subjects were made aware of these matching procedures. We ran two treatments which consisted of 8 subjects and two treatments of 16 subjects. Therefore, we have a total of 1440 data points for both sender and receiver.
A few comments on our methodology are in order. Since we expected overcommunication, even though only the senders incurred the communication costs, we designed the experiment to reduce the social preferences of the sender towards the receiver. First, we emphasized the di¤erences in the payo¤s by displaying the per period payo¤ of both subjects. Second, we emphasized the anonymous matching whereby after each round of 15 periods, the players would be rematched with a new partner. This was done in order to discourage any implicit reciprocal play. Finally, many experimental communication papers rematch the subjects after each period. However, we decided not to rematch, as there is a reasonably di¢cult coordination problem, which would be aggravated by rematching after every period.
Results
In each of the four rounds, the subjects exhibited learning across periods 1-15. Across all periods, the relationship between the sender's payo¤s and the period in which it was obtained is very signi…cant (p = 0:01). However, within periods 5-15, the relationship is not signi…cant (p = 0:7). Therefore, within each round, we exclude from consideration the data obtained in periods 1-4.
7 See the appendix for this table. 8 The total amount earned in the experiment ranged from $6:29 to $20:54, with an average of $15:62.
Overall, the equilibrium predictions do rather poorly. Within each communication cost treatment, there is a signi…cant di¤erence between the sender's payo¤s and the equilibrium prediction. In all but the highest cost treatment, there is a signi…cant di¤erence between the receiver's payo¤s and the equilibrium prediction. This data is presented in Table 1 . Recall that the receiver's payo¤s correspond to the accuracy of the receiver's action and the sender's payo¤s correspond to this accuracy minus communication costs. A glance at Table   1 suggests that as communication costs increase, the actions are becoming more accurate yet the senders are doing worse relative to the equilibrium predictions. This suggests that the senders are overcommunicating. In particular, the sender's payo¤s vary too much with communication costs and the receiver's payo¤s do not vary enough. This is con…rmed by the following regressions with the dependent variable of actual payo¤s minus equilibrium payo¤s. In regressions (S1) (S5) of Table 2 , the dependent variable is the sender's actual payo¤s minus the sender's equilibrium payo¤s and in regressions (R1) (R5) of Table 3 , the dependent variable is the receiver's actual payo¤s minus the receiver's equilibrium payo¤s.
Sender
The independent variables included the communication costs faced by the sender, the time in which it took the subject to select their decision. Regressions (S1) (S4) and (R1) (R4) do not account for possible …xed e¤ects in our panel data, however regressions (S5) and (R5) perform a subject speci…c …xed e¤ect regression.
(S1) Table 3 : Results of regressions where the dependent variable is the receiver's actual payo¤s minus receiver's equilibrium payo¤s and ** indicates signi…cance at p < 0:01.
The number of observations is not constant in either table because, for regressions involving response time, we only included observations with response times greater than 0. 9 First, note that in Table 2 , every speci…cation involving communication costs has a negative and signi…cant estimate. This suggests that as communication costs increase, the senders do worse relative to the equilibrium predictions. We note the opposite e¤ect the receivers. Table 3 shows that in (R1), (R3), and (R5), the estimates for the coe¢cient for communication costs 9 The z-Tree output included negative response times. are positive and signi…cant. In (R4) the coe¢cient is estimated to be positive but it is not signi…cant. Therefore, as the communication costs increase, the receivers do better relative to the equilibrium predictions.
Also note the results of Tables 2 and 3 involving the time it took the subject to make the choice. In all 8 speci…cations involving response time, the estimate is signi…cant and positive.
Consistent with the literature, we …nd a relationship between response time and performance.
We account for the subject speci…c …xed e¤ects in (S5) and (R5), where we …nd that the response time variable remains signi…cant. These results rule out the claim that the previous response time results are driven by the heterogeneity of the subjects. Also note that for each speci…cation, the estimates for the sender are larger than that for the receiver. This suggests that the sender's problem is more di¢cult than the receiver's. Therefore, additional time considering choice as a sender is more productive than that as a receiver.
Although the equilibrium predictions do rather poorly, the subjects do exhibit some degree of sophistication. Perhaps, this is best appreciated by the inference of the empty signal by the receiver as a function of the communication costs. We perform a binomial probit with the communication costs as an independent variable and the probability that the empty message leads to an action of 0 as the dependent variable. The results of this probit are listed in Table   4 . Table 4 : Binomial probit of subjects selecting the action 0 upon observing the empty message, where ** indicates signi…cance at p < 0:01
The results of the probit analysis suggest that there is a negative relationship between the probability that the receiver plays the action 0 after observing the empty message and the communication costs faced by the sender. Recall, our discussion of the equilibrium predictions.
In equilibrium for low communication costs, the sender sends the empty message on a single state, the focal state being 0. In equilibrium for intermediate costs, the sender sends the empty message for 3 states, the focal states being 1, 0, and 1. In equilibrium, for large costs, the sender sends the empty message, e¤ectively for all states. While the senders do not behave exactly as in equilibrium, in our experiment there is a relationship between the number of states on which the empty message is sent and communication costs. Further, the receivers are inferring that qualitative behavior and therefore there is a negative relationship between selecting the action 0 after observing the empty message and the communication costs faced by the sender.
Conclusions
We run an experiment where the messages available to the sender imperfectly describe the state of the world, however the sender can improve communication, at a cost, by increasing the complexity or elaborateness of the message. The incentives of the players are aligned in that both sender and receiver are paid an amount which is increasing in the accuracy of the receiver's action. Although the equilibrium predictions of Hertel and Smith (2010) do rather poorly, our experimental results do corroborate some of the qualitative predictions.
In particular we …nd that the payo¤s of both sender and receiver are negatively related to the communication costs incurred by the sender. We also …nd that, expensive signals are conserved when communication is expensive and that and that receivers infer this relationship.
Consistent with the communication literature, albeit in very di¤erent setting, we …nd that there is overcommunication. For the receivers, there is a positive relationship between the payo¤s relative to the equilibrium predictions and communication costs. This relationship is negative for the senders. We also …nd that the response time of both the sender and receiver are positively related to payo¤s, implying that more thought on the part of our subjects leads to better communication outcomes.
We view the results of this paper to be a con…rmation of the robustness of the overcommu-nication found in previous communication experiments which were conducted in very di¤erent settings. In these cheap talk experiments, the sender and receiver have di¤erent preferences over the action of the receiver. Therefore, overcommunication in these experiments takes the form that the senders do not do not conceal the truth enough. Unlike the overcommunication found these settings, the senders in our experiment say too much. Given that we observe similar behavior in such di¤erent settings, it would seem that overcommunication is a robust phenomenon.
Appendix
Although the payo¤s were speci…ed by equations (1) and (2), the subjects were also presented with the following table.
Action -3 -2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1. 
